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<p>In <a href="Metaphilosophy" title="Metaphilosophy">metaphilosophy</a> and <a href="Ethics" title="Ethics">ethics</a>, <b>metaethics</b> is the study of the nature, scope, ground, and meaning of <a href="Moral_judgment" class="mw-redirect" title="Moral judgment">moral judgment</a>, ethical belief, or <a href="Value_(ethics)" title="Value (ethics)">values</a>. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by <a href="Philosopher" class="mw-redirect" title="Philosopher">philosophers</a>, the others being <a href="Normative_ethics" title="Normative ethics">normative ethics</a> (questions of how one ought to be and act) and <a href="Applied_ethics" title="Applied ethics">applied ethics</a> (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).

</p><p>While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, metaethics addresses questions about the nature of <a href="Good" title="Good">goodness</a>, how one can discriminate good from evil, and what the proper account of moral knowledge is. Similar to accounts of <a href="Epistemology" title="Epistemology">knowledge</a> generally, the threat of skepticism about the possibility of <a href="Ethics" title="Ethics">moral</a> knowledge and cognitively meaningful moral propositions often motivates positive accounts in metaethics.<sup id="cite_ref-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Another distinction is often made between the nature of questions related to each: first-order (substantive) questions belong to the domain of normative ethics, whereas metaethics addresses second-order (formal) questions.

</p><p>Some theorists argue that a <a href="Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">metaphysical</a> account of <a href="Morality" title="Morality">morality</a> is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical moral decisions; others reason from opposite premises and suggest that studying moral judgments about proper actions can guide us to a true account of the nature of morality.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Metaethical_questions">Metaethical questions</h2></div>

<p>According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, there are three kinds of metaethical problems, or three general questions:<sup id="cite_ref-Garner_and_Rosen_2-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Garner_and_Rosen-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<ol><li>What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral <a href="Semantics" title="Semantics">semantics</a>)

<ul><li>Asks about the meanings of such words as 'good', 'bad', 'right', and 'wrong' (see <a href="Value_theory" title="Value theory">value theory</a>)</li></ul></li>

<li>What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral <a href="Ontology" title="Ontology">ontology</a>)

<ul><li>Asks questions of whether moral judgments are <a href="Moral_absolutism" title="Moral absolutism">absolute</a> or <a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">relative</a>, of one kind or <a href="Value_pluralism" title="Value pluralism">many kinds</a>, etc.</li></ul></li>

<li>How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral <a href="Epistemology" title="Epistemology">epistemology</a>)

<ul><li>Asks such questions as how we can know if something is right or wrong, if at all.</li></ul></li></ol>

<p>Garner and Rosen say that answers to the three basic questions "are not unrelated, and sometimes an answer to one will strongly suggest, or perhaps even entail, an answer to another."<sup id="cite_ref-Garner_and_Rosen_2-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Garner_and_Rosen-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> A metaethical theory, unlike a <a href="Normative_ethics" title="Normative ethics">normative ethical</a> theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may have profound implications as to the validity and meaning of normative ethical claims. An answer to any of the three example questions above would not itself be a normative ethical statement.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Moral_semantics">Moral semantics</h2></div>

<p><b>Moral semantics</b> attempts to answer the question, "What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?" Answers may have implications for answers to the other two questions as well.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Cognitivist_theories">Cognitivist theories</h3></div>

<p><i><a href="Cognitivism_(ethics)" title="Cognitivism (ethics)">Cognitivist</a></i> theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express <a href="Proposition" title="Proposition">propositions</a> (i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or '<a href="Truth-bearer" title="Truth-bearer">truth bearers</a>', capable of being true or false), as opposed to <a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">non-cognitivism</a>. Most forms of cognitivism hold that some such propositions are true (including moral realism and ethical subjectivism), as opposed to <a href="Error_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Error theory">error theory</a>, which asserts that all are erroneous.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Moral_realism">Moral realism</h4></div>

<p><a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">Moral realism</a> (in the <i>robust</i> sense; see <a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">moral universalism</a> for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about <i>robust</i> or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Metaethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of "<a href="Anti-realism" title="Anti-realism">anti-realism</a>" regarding moral facts: <a href="Ethical_subjectivism" title="Ethical subjectivism">ethical subjectivism</a>, <a href="Error_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Error theory">error theory</a>, or <a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">non-cognitivism</a>. Realism comes in two main varieties:

</p>

<ol><li><i><a href="Ethical_naturalism" title="Ethical naturalism">Ethical naturalism</a></i> holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are <a href="Reductionism" title="Reductionism">reducible</a> or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as <a href="Supervenience" title="Supervenience">supervenience</a>) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have <a href="Empiricism" title="Empiricism">empirical</a> knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many <a href="Modern_philosophy" title="Modern philosophy">modern</a> ethical theorists, particularly <a href="Utilitarianism" title="Utilitarianism">utilitarians</a>.</li>

<li><i><a href="Ethical_non-naturalism" title="Ethical non-naturalism">Ethical non-naturalism</a></i>, as put forward by <a href="G._E._Moore" title="G. E. Moore">G. E. Moore</a>, holds that there are objective and <i>irreducible</i> moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have <a href="Ethical_intuitionism" title="Ethical intuitionism">intuitive</a> or otherwise <i><a href="A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori">a priori</a></i> awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's <a href="Open_question_argument" class="mw-redirect" title="Open question argument">open question argument</a> against what he considered the <a href="Naturalistic_fallacy" title="Naturalistic fallacy">naturalistic fallacy</a> was largely responsible for the birth of metaethical research in contemporary <a href="Analytic_philosophy" title="Analytic philosophy">analytic philosophy</a>.</li></ol>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Ethical_subjectivism">Ethical subjectivism</h4></div>

<p><a href="Ethical_subjectivism" title="Ethical subjectivism">Ethical subjectivism</a> is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual. Most forms of ethical subjectivism are <a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">relativist</a>, but there are notable forms that are <a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">universalist</a>:

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<ul><li><a href="Ideal_observer_theory" title="Ideal observer theory">Ideal observer theory</a> holds that what is right is determined by the <a href="Attitude_(psychology)" title="Attitude (psychology)">attitudes</a> that a hypothetical <i>ideal observer</i> would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Though a subjectivist theory due to its reference to a particular (albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal Observer Theory still purports to provide <a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">universal</a> answers to moral questions.</li>

<li><a href="Divine_command_theory" title="Divine command theory">Divine command theory</a> holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the <i><a href="Euthyphro" title="Euthyphro">Euthyphro</a></i> (see the <a href="Euthyphro_problem" class="mw-redirect" title="Euthyphro problem">Euthyphro problem</a>) but retains some modern defenders (<a href="Robert_Merrihew_Adams" title="Robert Merrihew Adams">Robert Adams</a>, <a href="Philip_L._Quinn" title="Philip L. Quinn">Philip Quinn</a>, and others). Like ideal observer theory, divine command theory purports to be <a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">universalist</a> despite its subjectivism.</li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Error_theory">Error theory</h4></div>

<p><a href="Error_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Error theory">Error theory</a>, another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false, as the properties discussed don't exist (moral goodness, virtue, evil, etc). Thus, both the statement "Murder is morally wrong" and the statement "Murder is morally permissible" are false, according to error theory. <a href="J._L._Mackie" title="J. L. Mackie">J. L. Mackie</a> is the best-known proponent of this view. Since error theory denies that there are moral truths, error theory entails <a href="Moral_nihilism" title="Moral nihilism">moral nihilism</a> and, thus, <a href="Moral_skepticism" title="Moral skepticism">moral skepticism</a>; however, neither moral nihilism nor moral skepticism conversely entail error theory.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Non-cognitivist_theories">Non-cognitivist theories</h3></div>

<p><a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">Non-cognitivist</a> theories hold that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine <a href="Proposition" title="Proposition">propositions</a>. Non-cognitivism is another form of moral anti-realism. Most forms of non-cognitivism are also forms of <a href="Expressivism" title="Expressivism">expressivism</a>, however some such as Mark Timmons and Terrence Horgan distinguish the two and allow the possibility of cognitivist forms of expressivism. Non-cognitivism includes:

</p>

<ul><li><a href="Emotivism" title="Emotivism">Emotivism</a>, defended by <a href="A._J._Ayer" title="A. J. Ayer">A. J. Ayer</a> and <a href="Charles_Stevenson_(philosopher)" title="Charles Stevenson (philosopher)">Charles Stevenson</a>, holds that ethical sentences serve merely to express emotions. Ayer argues that ethical sentences are expressions of approval or disapproval, not assertions. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Boo on killing!".</li>

<li><a href="Quasi-realism" title="Quasi-realism">Quasi-realism</a>, defended by <a href="Simon_Blackburn" title="Simon Blackburn">Simon Blackburn</a>, holds that ethical statements behave linguistically like factual claims and can be appropriately called "true" or "false", even though there are no ethical facts for them to correspond to. <a href="Projectivism" title="Projectivism">Projectivism</a> and <a href="Moral_fictionalism" class="mw-redirect" title="Moral fictionalism">moral fictionalism</a> are related theories.</li>

<li><a href="Universal_prescriptivism" title="Universal prescriptivism">Universal prescriptivism</a>, defended by <a href="R._M._Hare" title="R. M. Hare">R. M. Hare</a>, holds that moral statements function like universalized <a href="Imperative_mood" title="Imperative mood">imperative</a> sentences. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Don't kill!" Hare's version of prescriptivism requires that moral prescriptions be <a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">universalizable</a>, and hence actually have objective values, in spite of failing to be <a href="Indicative" class="mw-redirect" title="Indicative">indicative</a> statements with <a href="Truth-value" class="mw-redirect" title="Truth-value">truth-values</a> per se.</li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Centralism_and_non-centralism">Centralism and non-centralism</h3></div>

<p>Yet another way of categorizing metaethical theories is to distinguish between <b>centralist</b> and <b>non-centralist</b> moral theories. The debate between centralism and non-centralism revolves around the relationship between the so-called "thin" and "thick" concepts of morality: thin moral concepts are those such as good, bad, right, and wrong; thick moral concepts are those such as courageous, inequitable, just, or dishonest.<sup id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>3<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> While both sides agree that the thin concepts are more general and the thick more specific, centralists hold that the thin concepts are antecedent to the thick ones and that the latter are therefore dependent on the former. That is, centralists argue that one must understand words like "right" and "ought" before understanding words like "just" and "unkind." Non-centralism rejects this view, holding that thin and thick concepts are on par with one another and even that the thick concepts are a sufficient starting point for understanding the thin ones.<sup id="cite_ref-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-4"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Non-centralism has been of particular importance to ethical naturalists in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as part of their argument that normativity is a non-excisable aspect of language and that there is no way of analyzing thick moral concepts into a purely descriptive element attached to a thin moral evaluation, thus undermining any fundamental division between facts and norms. <a href="Allan_Gibbard" title="Allan Gibbard">Allan Gibbard</a>, <a href="R._M._Hare" title="R. M. Hare">R. M. Hare</a>, and <a href="Simon_Blackburn" title="Simon Blackburn">Simon Blackburn</a> have argued in favor of the fact/norm distinction, meanwhile, with Gibbard going so far as to argue that, even if conventional English has only mixed normative terms (that is, terms that are neither purely descriptive nor purely normative), we could develop a nominally English metalanguage that still allowed us to maintain the division between factual descriptions and normative evaluations.<sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-6"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Moral_ontology">Moral ontology</h2></div>

<p><b>Moral ontology</b> attempts to answer the question, "What is the nature of moral judgments?"

</p><p>Amongst those who believe there to be some standard(s) of morality (as opposed to <a href="Moral_nihilism" title="Moral nihilism">moral nihilists</a>), there are two divisions:

</p>

<ol><li><a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">universalists</a>, who hold that the same moral facts or principles apply to everyone everywhere; and</li>

<li><a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">relativists</a>, who hold that different moral facts or principles apply to different people or societies.</li></ol>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_universalism">Moral universalism</h3></div>

<p><a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">Moral universalism</a> (or universal morality) is the metaethical position that some system of ethics, or a <a href="Universal_ethic" class="mw-redirect" title="Universal ethic">universal ethic</a>, applies universally, that is to all intelligent beings regardless of <a href="Culture" title="Culture">culture</a>, <a href="Race_(classification_of_human_beings)" class="mw-redirect" title="Race (classification of human beings)">race</a>, <a href="Sex" title="Sex">sex</a>, <a href="Religion" title="Religion">religion</a>, <a href="Nationality" title="Nationality">nationality</a>, <a href="Sexual_orientation" title="Sexual orientation">sexuality</a>, or other distinguishing feature. The source or justification of this system may be thought to be, for instance, <a href="Human_nature" title="Human nature">human nature</a>, shared vulnerability to suffering, the demands of universal <a href="Reason" title="Reason">reason</a>, what is common among existing moral codes, or the common mandates of <a href="Religion" title="Religion">religion</a> (although it can be argued that the latter is not in fact moral universalism because it may distinguish between Gods and mortals). Moral universalism is the opposing position to various forms of <a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">moral relativism</a>.

</p><p>Universalist theories are generally forms of <a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">moral realism</a>, though exceptions exists, such as the subjectivist <a href="Ideal_observer_theory" title="Ideal observer theory">ideal observer</a> and <a href="Divine_command_theory" title="Divine command theory">divine command</a> theories, and the non-cognitivist <a href="Universal_prescriptivism" title="Universal prescriptivism">universal prescriptivism</a> of <a href="R.M._Hare" class="mw-redirect" title="R.M. Hare">R. M. Hare</a>. Forms of moral universalism include:

</p>

<ul><li>Value monism is the common form of universalism, which holds that all goods are <a href="Commensurability_(ethics)" title="Commensurability (ethics)">commensurable</a> on a single value scale.</li>

<li><a href="Value_pluralism" title="Value pluralism">Value pluralism</a> contends that there are two or more genuine scales of value, knowable as such, yet incommensurable, so that any prioritization of these values is either non-cognitive or subjective. A value pluralist might, for example, contend that both a life as a nun and a life as a mother realize genuine values (in a universalist sense), yet they are incompatible (nuns may not have children), and there is no purely rational way to measure which is preferable. A notable proponent of this view is <a href="Isaiah_Berlin" title="Isaiah Berlin">Isaiah Berlin</a>.</li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_relativism">Moral relativism</h3></div>

<p><a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">Moral relativism</a> maintains that all moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single standard exists by which one can objectively assess the truth of a moral proposition. Metaethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as "good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" do not stand subject to <a href="Universality_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Universality (philosophy)">universal</a> <a href="Truth" title="Truth">truth</a> conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference. Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one <i>ought</i> to do based on societal or individual <a href="Norm_(sociology)" class="mw-redirect" title="Norm (sociology)">norms</a>, and one cannot adjudicate these using some independent standard of evaluation. The latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing <a href="Thermodynamic_temperature" title="Thermodynamic temperature">temperature</a> or for determining <a href="Proof_theory" title="Proof theory">mathematical truths</a>. <span class="clarify-content" style="padding-left:0.1em; padding-right:0.1em; color:var(--color-subtle, #54595d); border:1px solid var(--border-color-subtle, #c8ccd1);">Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism entails <a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">non-cognitivism</a>, while others consider it a form of <a href="Cognitivism_(ethics)" title="Cognitivism (ethics)">cognitivism</a>. Some but not all relativist theories are forms of <a href="Moral_subjectivism" class="mw-redirect" title="Moral subjectivism">moral subjectivism</a>, although not all subjectivist theories are relativistic.</span>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_nihilism">Moral nihilism</h3></div>

<p><a href="Moral_nihilism" title="Moral nihilism">Moral nihilism</a>, also known as ethical nihilism, is the metaethical view that nothing has intrinsic moral value. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is intrinsically neither morally right nor morally wrong. Moral nihilism must be distinguished from <a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">moral relativism</a>, which does allow for moral statements to be intrinsically true or false in a non-universal sense, but does not assign any static truth-values to moral statements. Insofar as only true statements can be known, moral nihilists are <a href="Moral_skepticism" title="Moral skepticism">moral skeptics</a>. Most forms of moral nihilism are <a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">non-cognitivist</a> and vice versa, though there are notable exceptions such as <a href="Universal_prescriptivism" title="Universal prescriptivism">universal prescriptivism</a> (which is semantically non-cognitive but substantially universal).

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Moral_epistemology">Moral epistemology</h2></div>

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<div class="side-box-text plainlist">Wikiquote has quotations related to <i><b><a href="https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Moral_epistemology" class="extiw external" title="q:Moral epistemology">Moral epistemology</a></b></i>.</div></div>

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<p><b>Moral epistemology</b> is the study of moral knowledge. It attempts to answer such questions as, "How may moral judgments be supported or defended?" and "Is moral knowledge possible?"

</p><p>If one presupposes a cognitivist interpretation of moral sentences, morality is justified by the moralist's knowledge of moral facts, and the theories to justify moral judgements are epistemological theories. Most moral epistemologies posit that moral knowledge is somehow possible (including empiricism and moral rationalism), as opposed to <a href="Moral_skepticism" title="Moral skepticism">moral skepticism</a>. Amongst them, there are those who hold that moral knowledge is gained inferentially on the basis of some sort of non-moral epistemic process, as opposed to <a href="Ethical_intuitionism" title="Ethical intuitionism">ethical intuitionism</a>.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_knowledge_gained_by_inference">Moral knowledge gained by inference</h3></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Empiricism">Empiricism</h4></div>

<p><a href="Empiricism" title="Empiricism">Empiricism</a> is the doctrine that knowledge is gained primarily through observation and experience. Metaethical theories that imply an empirical epistemology include:

</p>

<ul><li><a href="Ethical_naturalism" title="Ethical naturalism">ethical naturalism</a>, which holds moral facts to be reducible to non-moral facts and thus knowable in the same ways; and</li>

<li>most common forms of <a href="Ethical_subjectivism" title="Ethical subjectivism">ethical subjectivism</a>, which hold that moral facts reduce to facts about individual opinions or cultural conventions and thus are knowable by observation of those conventions.</li></ul>

<p>There are exceptions within subjectivism however, such as <a href="Ideal_observer_theory" title="Ideal observer theory">ideal observer theory</a>, which implies that moral facts may be known through a rational process, and <a href="Subjectivism#Ethical_subjectivism" title="Subjectivism">individualist ethical subjectivism</a>, which holds that moral facts are merely personal opinions and so may be known only through introspection. Empirical arguments for ethics run into the <i><a href="Is-ought" class="mw-redirect" title="Is-ought">is-ought</a></i> problem, which asserts that the way the world <i>is</i> cannot alone instruct people how they <i>ought</i> to act.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Moral_rationalism">Moral rationalism</h4></div>

<p><a href="Moral_rationalism" title="Moral rationalism">Moral rationalism</a>, also called ethical rationalism, is the view according to which moral truths (or at least general moral principles) are knowable <i><a href="A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori">a priori</a></i>, by reason alone. <a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a> and <a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a>, prominent figures in the <a href="History_of_philosophy" title="History of philosophy">history of philosophy</a>, defended moral rationalism. <a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a> and <a href="Friedrich_Nietzsche" title="Friedrich Nietzsche">Friedrich Nietzsche</a> are two figures in the history of philosophy who have rejected moral rationalism.

</p><p>Recent philosophers who defended moral rationalism include <a href="R._M._Hare" title="R. M. Hare">R. M. Hare</a>, <a href="Christine_Korsgaard" title="Christine Korsgaard">Christine Korsgaard</a>, <a href="Alan_Gewirth" title="Alan Gewirth">Alan Gewirth</a>, and <a href="Michael_A._Smith_(philosopher)" title="Michael A. Smith (philosopher)">Michael Smith</a>. A moral rationalist may adhere to any number of different semantic theories as well; <a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">moral realism</a> is compatible with rationalism, and the subjectivist <a href="Ideal_observer_theory" title="Ideal observer theory">ideal observer theory</a> and non-cognitivist <a href="Universal_prescriptivism" title="Universal prescriptivism">universal prescriptivism</a> both entail it.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Ethical_intuitionism">Ethical intuitionism</h3></div>

<p><a href="Ethical_intuitionism" title="Ethical intuitionism">Ethical intuitionism</a> is the view according to which some moral truths can be known <i>without</i> inference. That is, the view is at its core a <a href="Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism">foundationalism</a> about moral beliefs. Such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies <a href="Cognitivism_(ethics)" title="Cognitivism (ethics)">cognitivism</a>. Ethical intuitionism commonly suggests <a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">moral realism</a>, the view that there are <a href="Objectivity_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Objectivity (philosophy)">objective</a> facts of morality and, to be more specific, <a href="Ethical_non-naturalism" title="Ethical non-naturalism">ethical non-naturalism</a>, the view that these evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural fact. However, neither moral realism nor ethical non-naturalism are essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists simply happen to hold those views as well. Ethical intuitionism comes in both a "rationalist" variety, and a more "empiricist" variety known as <a href="Moral_sense_theory" title="Moral sense theory">moral sense theory</a>.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_skepticism">Moral skepticism</h3></div>

<p><a href="Moral_skepticism" title="Moral skepticism">Moral skepticism</a> is the <a href="Class_(philosophy)" title="Class (philosophy)">class</a> of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, <a href="Modal_logic" title="Modal logic">modal</a>, claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Forms of moral skepticism include, but are not limited to, <a href="Error_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Error theory">error theory</a> and most but not all forms of <a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">non-cognitivism</a>.

</p>

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<ul><li><a href="Anthropic_principle" title="Anthropic principle">Anthropic principle</a></li>

<li><a href="Axiology" class="mw-redirect" title="Axiology">Axiology</a></li>

<li><a href="Deontic_logic" title="Deontic logic">Deontic logic</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethical_subjectivism" title="Ethical subjectivism">Ethical subjectivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Fact%E2%80%93value_distinction" title="Fact–value distinction">Fact–value distinction</a></li>

<li><a href="Is%E2%80%93ought_problem" title="Is–ought problem">Is–ought problem</a></li>

<li><a href="Meta-rights" title="Meta-rights">Meta-rights</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">Moral realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Normative_ethics" title="Normative ethics">Normative ethics</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Principia_Ethica" title="Principia Ethica">Principia Ethica</a></i></li>

<li><a href="The_Right_and_the_Good" title="The Right and the Good">The Right and the Good</a></li></ul>

</div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2></div>

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</style><cite id="CITEREFAudi2015" class="citation book cs1">Audi, Robert (2015). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ISBN1107015057"><i>The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy</i></a>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 331-2. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1107015050</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Garner_and_Rosen-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Garner_and_Rosen_2-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Garner_and_Rosen_2-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGarnerBernard_Rosen1967" class="citation book cs1">Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967). <i>Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics</i>. New York: <a href="Macmillan_Publishers" title="Macmillan Publishers">Macmillan</a>. p. 215. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/67-18887">67-18887</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-3"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a href="Frank_Jackson_(philosopher)" class="mw-redirect" title="Frank Jackson (philosopher)">Jackson, Frank</a>. 1992. "Critical Notice." <i><a href="Australasian_Journal_of_Philosophy" title="Australasian Journal of Philosophy">Australasian Journal of Philosophy</a></i> 70(4):475–488.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-4">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Hurley, S.L. (1989). <i>Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity</i>. Oxford: <a href="Oxford_University_Press" title="Oxford University Press">Oxford University Press</a>.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-5"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-5">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Hurley, S.L. (1985). "Objectivity and Disagreement." in <i>Morality and Objectivity</i>, <a href="Ted_Honderich" title="Ted Honderich">Ted Honderich</a> (ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 54–97.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-6"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a href="Jocelyne_Couture-Nowak" title="Jocelyne Couture-Nowak">Couture, Jocelyne</a>, and <a href="Kai_Nielsen_(philosopher)" title="Kai Nielsen (philosopher)">Kai Nielsen</a>. 1995. "Introduction: The Ages of Metaethics." Pp. 1–30 in <i>On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays in Metaethics</i>, edited by J. Couture and K. Nielsen. Calgary: <a href="University_of_Calgary_Press" title="University of Calgary Press">University of Calgary Press</a>.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-7"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGibbard1993" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="Allan_Gibbard" title="Allan Gibbard">Gibbard, Allan</a> (1993). E. Villanueva (ed.). "Reply to Railton". <i>Naturalism and Normativity</i>. <b>4</b>. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview: Ridgeview Publishing Company: <span class="nowrap">52–</span>59. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F1522826">10.2307/1522826</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1522826">1522826</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

</ol></div></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2></div>

<div class="side-box-text plainlist">Wikimedia Commons has media related to <span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"><a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Meta-ethics" class="extiw external" title="commons:Category:Meta-ethics">Meta-ethics</a></span>.</div></div>

</div>

<ul><li><cite id="CITEREFSayre-McCord" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Sayre-McCord, Geoff. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/">"Metaethics"</a>. In <a href="Edward_N._Zalta" title="Edward N. Zalta">Zalta, Edward N.</a> (ed.). <i><a href="Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>.</cite></li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/metaethi/">Metaethics</a> – entry in the <i><a href="Internet_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i></li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ditext.com/hare/lm.html"><i>The Language of Morals</i></a> (1952) by R. M. Hare</li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682"><i>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals</i></a> by Immanuel Kant</li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060707035318/http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/ethics.htm">Essays by philosopher Michael Huemer</a> on meta-ethics, especially intuitionism</li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.moralbalance.com/English/ch_04.html"><i>Relativity theory of ethics</i></a> by J. J. Mittler</li></ul>

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</style><div id="Ethics584" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Ethics" title="Ethics">Ethics</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Normative_ethics" title="Normative ethics">Normative</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Consequentialism" title="Consequentialism">Consequentialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Deontological_ethics" class="mw-redirect" title="Deontological ethics">Deontology</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_particularism" title="Moral particularism">Particularism</a></li>

<li><a href="Pragmatic_ethics" title="Pragmatic ethics">Pragmatic</a></li>

<li><a href="Suffering-focused_ethics" title="Suffering-focused ethics">Suffering-focused</a></li>

<li><a href="Utilitarianism" title="Utilitarianism">Utilitarianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Virtue_ethics" title="Virtue ethics">Virtue</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Applied_ethics" title="Applied ethics">Applied</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Animal_ethics" title="Animal ethics">Animal</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_of_artificial_intelligence" title="Ethics of artificial intelligence">Artificial intelligence</a></li>

<li><a href="Business_ethics" title="Business ethics">Business</a></li>

<li><a href="Computer_ethics" title="Computer ethics">Computer</a></li>

<li><a href="Discourse_ethics" title="Discourse ethics">Discourse</a></li>

<li><a href="Economic_ethics" title="Economic ethics">Economic</a></li>

<li><a href="Engineering_ethics" title="Engineering ethics">Engineering</a></li>

<li><a href="Environmental_ethics" title="Environmental ethics">Environmental</a>

<li><a href="Legal_ethics" title="Legal ethics">Legal</a></li>

<li><a href="Machine_ethics" title="Machine ethics">Machine</a></li>

<li><a href="Marketing_ethics" title="Marketing ethics">Marketing</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_of_eating_meat" title="Ethics of eating meat">Meat eating</a></li>

<li><a href="Media_ethics" title="Media ethics">Media</a></li>

<li><a href="Medical_ethics" title="Medical ethics">Medical</a></li>

<li><a href="Nursing_ethics" title="Nursing ethics">Nursing</a></li>

<li><a href="Professional_ethics" title="Professional ethics">Professional</a></li>

<li><a href="Programming_ethics" title="Programming ethics">Programming</a></li>

<li><a href="Research_ethics" title="Research ethics">Research</a></li>

<li><a href="Sexual_ethics" title="Sexual ethics">Sexual</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_of_technology" title="Ethics of technology">Technology</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_of_terraforming" title="Ethics of terraforming">Terraforming</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_of_uncertain_sentience" title="Ethics of uncertain sentience">Uncertain sentience</a></li>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Moral_absolutism" title="Moral absolutism">Absolutism</a></li>

<li><a href="Axiological_ethics" title="Axiological ethics">Axiology</a></li>

<li><a href="Cognitivism_(ethics)" title="Cognitivism (ethics)">Cognitivism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">Realism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Ethical_naturalism" title="Ethical naturalism">Naturalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethical_non-naturalism" title="Ethical non-naturalism">Non-naturalism</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Ethical_subjectivism" title="Ethical subjectivism">Subjectivism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Ideal_observer_theory" title="Ideal observer theory">Ideal observer theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Divine_command_theory" title="Divine command theory">Divine command theory</a></li></ul></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Moral_constructivism" title="Moral constructivism">Constructivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Euthyphro_dilemma" title="Euthyphro dilemma">Euthyphro dilemma</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethical_intuitionism" title="Ethical intuitionism">Intuitionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_nihilism" title="Moral nihilism">Nihilism</a></li>

<li><a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">Non-cognitivism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Emotivism" title="Emotivism">Emotivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Expressivism" title="Expressivism">Expressivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Quasi-realism" title="Quasi-realism">Quasi-realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Universal_prescriptivism" title="Universal prescriptivism">Universal prescriptivism</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Moral_rationalism" title="Moral rationalism">Rationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_relativism" title="Moral relativism">Relativism</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_skepticism" title="Moral skepticism">Skepticism</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_universalism" title="Moral universalism">Universalism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Value_pluralism" title="Value pluralism">Value monism – Value pluralism</a></li></ul></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Schools</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Buddhist_ethics" title="Buddhist ethics">Buddhist</a></li>

<li><a href="Christian_ethics" title="Christian ethics">Christian</a>

<ul><li><a href="Protestant_work_ethic" title="Protestant work ethic">Protestant</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Confucianism" title="Confucianism">Confucian</a></li>

<li><a href="Epicureanism" title="Epicureanism">Epicurean</a></li>

<li><a href="Existentialism" title="Existentialism">Existentialist</a></li>

<li><a href="Feminist_ethics" title="Feminist ethics">Feminist</a></li>

<li><a href="Islamic_ethics" title="Islamic ethics">Islamic</a></li>

<li><a href="Jewish_ethics" title="Jewish ethics">Jewish</a></li>

<li><a href="Kantian_ethics" title="Kantian ethics">Kantian</a></li>

<li><a href="Rousseauism" class="mw-redirect" title="Rousseauism">Rousseauian</a></li>

<li><a href="Stoicism" title="Stoicism">Stoic</a></li>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Concepts</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Accountability" title="Accountability">Accountability</a></li>

<li><a href="Authority" title="Authority">Authority</a></li>

<li><a href="Autonomy" title="Autonomy">Autonomy</a></li>

<li><a href="Blame" title="Blame">Blame</a></li>

<li><a href="Common_sense" title="Common sense">Common sense</a></li>

<li><a href="Compassion" title="Compassion">Compassion</a></li>

<li><a href="Conscience" title="Conscience">Conscience</a></li>

<li><a href="Consent" title="Consent">Consent</a></li>

<li><a href="Culture_of_life" title="Culture of life">Culture of life</a></li>

<li><a href="Desert_(philosophy)" title="Desert (philosophy)">Desert</a></li>

<li><a href="Dignity" title="Dignity">Dignity</a></li>

<li><a href="Double_standard" title="Double standard">Double standard</a></li>

<li><a href="Egalitarianism" title="Egalitarianism">Equality</a></li>

<li><a href="Etiquette" title="Etiquette">Etiquette</a></li>

<li><a href="Eudaimonia" title="Eudaimonia">Eudaimonia</a></li>

<li><a href="Family_values" title="Family values">Family values</a></li>

<li><a href="Fidelity" title="Fidelity">Fidelity</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_evil" title="Problem of evil">Problem of evil</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Greed" title="Greed">Greed</a></li>

<li><a href="Happiness" title="Happiness">Happiness</a></li>

<li><a href="Honour" title="Honour">Honour</a></li>

<li><a href="Ideal_(ethics)" title="Ideal (ethics)">Ideal</a></li>

<li><a href="Immorality" title="Immorality">Immorality</a></li>

<li><a href="Importance#Ethics,_morality,_and_normativity" title="Importance">Importance</a></li>

<li><a href="Justice" title="Justice">Justice</a></li>

<li><a href="Liberty" title="Liberty">Liberty</a></li>

<li><a href="Loyalty" title="Loyalty">Loyalty</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_agency" title="Moral agency">Moral agency</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_courage" title="Moral courage">Moral courage</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_hierarchy" title="Moral hierarchy">Moral hierarchy</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_imperative" title="Moral imperative">Moral imperative</a></li>

<li><a href="Morality" title="Morality">Morality</a></li>

<li><a href="Pacifism" title="Pacifism">Pacifism</a></li>

<li><a href="Political_freedom" title="Political freedom">Political freedom</a></li>

<li><a href="Precept" title="Precept">Precept</a></li>

<li><a href="Punishment" title="Punishment">Punishment</a></li>

<li><a href="Rights" title="Rights">Rights</a></li>

<li><a href="Self-discipline" class="mw-redirect" title="Self-discipline">Self-discipline</a></li>

<li><a href="Suffering" title="Suffering">Suffering</a></li>

<li><a href="Stewardship" title="Stewardship">Stewardship</a></li>

<li><a href="Sympathy" title="Sympathy">Sympathy</a></li>

<li><a href="Theodicy" title="Theodicy">Theodicy</a></li>

<li><a href="Torture" title="Torture">Torture</a></li>

<li><a href="Trust_(social_science)" title="Trust (social science)">Trust</a></li>

<li><a href="Utility" title="Utility">Utility</a></li>

<li><a href="Value_(ethics)" title="Value (ethics)">Value</a>

<ul><li><a href="Instrumental_and_intrinsic_value" title="Instrumental and intrinsic value">Instrumental</a></li>

<li><a href="Intrinsic_value_(ethics)" title="Intrinsic value (ethics)">Intrinsic</a></li>

<li><a href="Japanese_values" title="Japanese values">Japan</a></li>

<li><a href="Values_(Western_philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Values (Western philosophy)">Western</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Virtue" title="Virtue">Virtue</a></li>

<li><a href="Wrongdoing" title="Wrongdoing">Wrong</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="List_of_ethicists" title="List of ethicists">Ethicists</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Confucius" title="Confucius">Confucius</a></li>

<li><a href="Socrates" title="Socrates">Socrates</a></li>

<li><a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a></li>

<li><a href="Aristotle" title="Aristotle">Aristotle</a></li>

<li><a href="Diogenes" title="Diogenes">Diogenes</a></li>

<li><a href="Mencius" title="Mencius">Mencius</a></li>

<li><a href="Xunzi_(philosopher)" title="Xunzi (philosopher)">Xunzi</a></li>

<li><a href="Cicero" title="Cicero">Cicero</a></li>

<li><a href="Augustine_of_Hippo" title="Augustine of Hippo">Augustine</a></li>

<li><a href="Thiruvalluvar" title="Thiruvalluvar">Valluvar</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Aquinas" title="Thomas Aquinas">Aquinas</a></li>

<li><a href="Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Spinoza</a></li>

<li><a href="Joseph_Butler" title="Joseph Butler">Butler</a></li>

<li><a href="Adam_Smith" title="Adam Smith">Smith</a></li>

<li><a href="Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel" title="Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel">Hegel</a></li>

<li><a href="Arthur_Schopenhauer" title="Arthur Schopenhauer">Schopenhauer</a></li>

<li><a href="Jeremy_Bentham" title="Jeremy Bentham">Bentham</a></li>

<li><a href="S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard" title="Søren Kierkegaard">Kierkegaard</a></li>

<li><a href="Henry_Sidgwick" title="Henry Sidgwick">Sidgwick</a></li>

<li><a href="Friedrich_Nietzsche" title="Friedrich Nietzsche">Nietzsche</a></li>

<li><a href="G._E._Moore" title="G. E. Moore">Moore</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Barth" title="Karl Barth">Barth</a></li>

<li><a href="Paul_Tillich" title="Paul Tillich">Tillich</a></li>

<li><a href="Dietrich_Bonhoeffer" title="Dietrich Bonhoeffer">Bonhoeffer</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Rawls" title="John Rawls">Rawls</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">Dewey</a></li>

<li><a href="Bernard_Williams" title="Bernard Williams">Williams</a></li>

<li><a href="J._L._Mackie" title="J. L. Mackie">Mackie</a></li>

<li><a href="G._E._M._Anscombe" title="G. E. M. Anscombe">Anscombe</a></li>

<li><a href="William_Frankena" title="William Frankena">Frankena</a></li>

<li><a href="Alasdair_MacIntyre" title="Alasdair MacIntyre">MacIntyre</a></li>

<li><a href="Peter_Singer" title="Peter Singer">Singer</a></li>

<li><a href="Derek_Parfit" title="Derek Parfit">Parfit</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Nagel</a></li>

<li><a href="Robert_Merrihew_Adams" title="Robert Merrihew Adams">Adams</a></li>

<li><a href="Charles_Taylor_(philosopher)" title="Charles Taylor (philosopher)">Taylor</a></li>

<li><a href="Joxe_Azurmendi" title="Joxe Azurmendi">Azurmendi</a></li>

<li><a href="Christine_Korsgaard" title="Christine Korsgaard">Korsgaard</a></li>

<li><a href="Martha_Nussbaum" title="Martha Nussbaum">Nussbaum</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Works</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0;font-style:italic;"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Nicomachean_Ethics" title="Nicomachean Ethics">Nicomachean Ethics</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(c. 322 BC)</span></li>

<li><a href="Tirukkural" class="mw-redirect" title="Tirukkural">Tirukkural</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(c. 450 CE)</span></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_(Spinoza_book)" class="mw-redirect" title="Ethics (Spinoza book)">Ethics (Spinoza)</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1677)</span></li>

<li><a href="Fifteen_Sermons_Preached_at_the_Rolls_Chapel" title="Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel">Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1726)</span></li>

<li><a href="A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature" title="A Treatise of Human Nature">A Treatise of Human Nature</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1740)</span></li>

<li><a href="The_Theory_of_Moral_Sentiments" title="The Theory of Moral Sentiments">The Theory of Moral Sentiments</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1759)</span></li>

<li><a href="An_Introduction_to_the_Principles_of_Morals_and_Legislation" title="An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation">An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1780)</span></li>

<li><a href="Groundwork_of_the_Metaphysics_of_Morals" title="Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals">Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1785)</span></li>

<li><a href="Critique_of_Practical_Reason" title="Critique of Practical Reason">Critique of Practical Reason</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1788)</span></li>

<li><a href="Elements_of_the_Philosophy_of_Right" title="Elements of the Philosophy of Right">Elements of the Philosophy of Right</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1820)</span></li>

<li><a href="Either/Or_(Kierkegaard_book)" title="Either/Or (Kierkegaard book)">Either/Or</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1843)</span></li>

<li><a href="Utilitarianism_(book)" title="Utilitarianism (book)">Utilitarianism</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1861)</span></li>

<li><a href="The_Methods_of_Ethics" title="The Methods of Ethics">The Methods of Ethics</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1874)</span></li>

<li><a href="On_the_Genealogy_of_Morality" title="On the Genealogy of Morality">On the Genealogy of Morality</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1887)</span></li>

<li><a href="Principia_Ethica" title="Principia Ethica">Principia Ethica</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1903)</span></li>

<li><a href="A_Theory_of_Justice" title="A Theory of Justice">A Theory of Justice</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1971)</span></li>

<li><a href="Practical_Ethics" title="Practical Ethics">Practical Ethics</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1979)</span></li>

<li><a href="After_Virtue" title="After Virtue">After Virtue</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1981)</span></li>

<li><a href="Reasons_and_Persons" title="Reasons and Persons">Reasons and Persons</a> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1984)</span></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Related</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Axiology" class="mw-redirect" title="Axiology">Axiology</a></li>

<li><a href="Casuistry" title="Casuistry">Casuistry</a></li>

<li><a href="Descriptive_ethics" title="Descriptive ethics">Descriptive ethics</a></li>

<li><a href="Ethics_in_religion" title="Ethics in religion">Ethics in religion</a></li>

<li><a href="Evolutionary_ethics" title="Evolutionary ethics">Evolutionary ethics</a></li>

<li><a href="History_of_ethics" title="History of ethics">History of ethics</a></li>

<li><a href="Human_rights" title="Human rights">Human rights</a></li>

<li><a href="Ideology" title="Ideology">Ideology</a></li>

<li><a href="Moral_psychology" title="Moral psychology">Moral psychology</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_law" class="mw-redirect" title="Philosophy of law">Philosophy of law</a></li>

<li><a href="Political_philosophy" title="Political philosophy">Political philosophy</a></li>

<li><a href="Population_ethics" title="Population ethics">Population ethics</a></li>

<li><a href="Rehabilitation_(penology)" title="Rehabilitation (penology)">Rehabilitation</a></li>

<li><a href="Secular_ethics" title="Secular ethics">Secular ethics</a></li>

<li><a href="Social_philosophy" title="Social philosophy">Social philosophy</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div>

<ul><li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Category"></span></span> Category</li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Outline"></span></span> <a href="Outline_of_ethics" title="Outline of ethics">Outline</a></li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"></span> <a href="Portal%3APhilosophy" title="Portal:Philosophy">Portal</a></li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="WikiProject"></span></span> WikiProject</li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div>

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